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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

)
)
)

llIILS' ROOFL."'Y.;, INC. ,

PlaintiffRespondent,

)

SALT LAKE CITY SQiOOL
DISI'RICT,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

vs.

DefenclantAppellant.

Case No. 15346

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action brought by Plaintiff roofing company against
the Defendant school district based upon an alleged breach of contract

concerning the roofing of a local high school.
DISPOSITIOO IN LOWER COURT
A trial was held before the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr.,
District Judge of the Third Judicial District.

The case was submitted

to the jury on special interrogatories and a Judgirent was subsequently
entered in favor of the Plaintiff in the approximate sun of $14,000.
RELIEF

sournr

ON APPF.AL

Plaintiff-Respondent seeks affirmation of the District Court
JudgJllent.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On Sunday night, October 20, 1974, a rainstonn occurred which
caused darrege to the Highland High School.

Although the damage of about

$1.200 was paid for by Plaintiff-~spondent's insurance carrier, the event
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precipitated the dismissal and te.rr.ri.nation of Plaintiff-Resp d

on ent for

the job.

Relative to that wrongful termination, Defendant-Appellant,

that "the main issue in dispute in this case is whether the conduct (
Defendant's agents waived the requirement of sealing the roof" as pre.
for in paragraph 11 of the contract.

In this regard, the follo.·:ino .,
0

-

testified to at trial:

1.

Ken Bills testified as tc a conversation on about Octc:~

1974 with Bruce Ririe, who was "the director of buildings and grouni.;
Defendant (Tr 3) and with Walter Jensen a few days later, ivho was th:
"inspector on the job" (Tr 62), as foll<ftls:
"Mr. Ririe told me that because it was getting
late in the year and they didn't want winter to set
in before we were finished that they wanted us to m:ive
faster. I then told Mr. Ririe it would be possible
for me to get a large group of men, an Elder's Quorum,
to come up and rip off a large section of roof, assisting in that and then we could go ahead and roof it.
However, doing that we could not cover it all at one
time. We had had very good weather up to that point
and Mr. Ririe and I discussed the use of visqueen with
weighting it dmvn and Mr. Ririe told me if I had the
visqueen on the project on the roof that we could go
ahead and do that.

Q (By Mr. Horgan) : After that conversation ivhat
did you do concerning the upper roof over the classrOOIDs1
A. My crews continued tearing off during the day,
and on Friday, October 18th, I believe or 17th or.18tn,
I had this Elder' s Quorum come and we did ·· - contlilued
tearing off and ripped off a large section of roof a::d
during the week Mr. Jensen, Russ, w; brother and u~vself
had a similar discussion concerning the visque~ ~ct tr.2
visqueen was on the job and we were told that if it ,.;as
to rain --"
(Tr 164:1-22)

"Mr. Jensen and Russ and I discussed the use of
visqueen should any stonns come up and we did ha\'e the
visqueen on the roof.
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0.

You discussed that, what was said.

A. That should 4;7e have any bad weather come before
we got all of the roof covered we were to lay out the
visqueen, overlap it and weight it down. When I mean
overlap the roof slopes slightly to the drains and that
we i;,-ould ta.1<e the sheet of visqueen going into the drain
secured with the next sheet overlapping it so if water,
a reasonable arnoi.mt of water were to fall it would ri.m
over the visqueen and go down into the drain. 11
(Tr 165:18-29)

2.

Russell Bills testified that he was a party to the conversa-

tion with Walter Jmsen and that the follCMing was said:
'Well, at that time as was indicated earlier by
Mr. Jens en the discussion about the roof being left

open was brought into it and at that time he told us
that it would be all right to tear it off and go ahead
without covering it each night. 11
(Tr 96:22-26)
Ken brought up the point he -would be
bringing up a crsv to tear off the roof at a IID.lch
faster rate so we could get it layed down and at that
tirre we told him we wouldn't be able to cover it every
night. He said tJiat was all right, we ¥-Duldn' t have
to cover it every night that we were doing that."

(Tr 97: 5-10)

3.

Donald Bills testified he also had a conversation with Walter

Jensen, when they started to tear off the roof, as follows:

". . . It was discussed that because th..:ings were
going so slowly we VJOuld have to change nonnal procedures of covering things each day and as long as we
had material there to cover, not seal but to cover the
roof in the event of an impending stonn that that w::iuld
be all right and so this is how we proceeded. That is
the only reason we tore up such a large area."
(Tr 117:25-30; 118:1)

4.
cc,

Halter Jensen, as an adverse wi.tness, testified as to his

,_:-;,1 ~,-,, -,;111

one of the Bills brothers as follows:
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"Hell, as I recall it, Mr. Bills said that __
or proposed, r~ther, that he bring in a rather large
crew, an Elder s Quorum, tc;i tear off the remaining
part of the roof and he said that way his crews could
work at a greater speed and accomplish rr'?re relaying
the roof and that would speed up the proJect which was
a 9ood idea from that standpo~t because things had been
golllg very slow up to that po mt. So I said, well that
the responsibility is yours, in effect not the exa~t
conversation, I said you can't open that mu.ch roof off
and leave it open, you have got to seal it, you have
got to cover it and in our discussion I proposed it
first that he put on two plys of asphalt and rrernbrane
to seal it and both of us were aware that was a rather
costly procedure to do that and he said well, we are
insured. I said I don't want any hassle with insurance
companies or anyone else, I don't want any water getti.ig
through the roof. Then he suggested placing tarps and
when I found out what he intended -- he was thinking of
placing plastic tarps on the deck, I said well, you will
have some problems and I outlined what they were. I
didn't attempt to discourage him or anything else because
it was his responsibility to take care of that. I merely
pointed out he would have to seal the edges canpletely.
Q.

What do you mean by sealing the edges ccxnpletely?

A. Well, you would have to seal the edges of the
plastic so that no water "1-.uuld go through them.
Q.

By the plastic you mean --

A.

The tarps they put down.

Q.

Are these also referred to as visqueeri.

A. Visaueen yes that is the trade name for it. Tnen
I further s.tld that y:m would have to be careful, he Wlld
have to be careful when he placed it d.CNm there wuld be no
gravel or anything on the deck so i f a person walking ov~
"1-.uuld uerforate it because that would destroy the value 01
t...l-te thlng because any leak would eventually find its way
into the building and you would still have problems. Tr.en
I called his attention to the wind factor because we~~
had a section of the roof blcwn off frcm the north en d
previous winter bad to replace three or four squares. an
I called his attention to the fact he would have to e~trer
aclliere it to the deck or put some weight do;vn, then eda·
ma.de the recoomendation as I recall or another. recom:nen ..:
tion and that was that he make the seams standmg _seams a;..
IIBke it secure as Illl..lC..'i as possible so there ,,uuld be r.o
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possibility of i;,uter going through those areas. Then
the next -- :L.1 our discussion, I am just getting my side
of our discussion, I suggested he contact other roofers
as I had no experience with that on a flat deck lih~ that
and that I wvuld consult with Mr. Ririe on the matter and
see what he thougpt about it and that was where we left it
at that point."
(Tr 82:8-30; 83:1-29)

Based on the above facts, the jury apparently believed the Billses
and detennined that the Defmdant-Appellant, through its agents Bruce Ririe
. and Halter Jensm, had waived the provisions of paragraph 11 of the contract
and thus were estopped to rely upon it in clarning that Plaintiff-Respondent
had breached the contract.
Since there was no question as to Defendant-Appellant's breach
of the contract in that they terminated the contract and told the Billses to
get off the project, the Court found in favor of Plaintiff-Respondent and
awarded the damages determined by the jury, which are not in dispute in this
Appeal.

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR lli FAil...ING TO RULE PS
A MATIER OF I.AW THAT PIAI::ITIFF B~ ITS <XlNTRACT WITH

DEFENDAJ.'IT.

Defendant-Appellant states in its Brief (Appellant's Brief p. 12-13)
that "Defend.mt sc..hool district answered this claim (Plaintiff's breach of

contract claim) by alleging that it was justified in terminating the contract
because of the breach of contract carrnitted by Plaintiff in its failure to
properly seal the roof as required by the specific contractual provisions
and

its subsequrnt failure to protect the building as was also required by
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the contract."

This statement is an outright fabrication o" :h

"' '' at t'.

Defendant-Appellant's Answer really

\V3S.

If the Court will reads::

Answer, it will find that there is no allegation of a breach 0 ~ cc::
by Defendant for failure to properly seal the roof.

Defendant-fa-:iJ;I

simply denies the claims of breach alleged by Plaintiff-Respondmt ~.:
then by affirmative defense alleges "tJiat Plaintiff failed to perfo::
work requested by Defendant in a professional, workmattlike and ex::e~·
manner.''
Defendant-Appellant then bases its entire argunent on the::
that it had alleged in its Answer that Plaintiff breached the contra::
The truth of the matter is that Defendant-Appellant did not raise t''of breach by reason of failing to properly seal the roof until triJl
response to such allegation at trial, Plaintiff-Respondent then alle:
there was no breach relative to the failure to seal because Defanck.:·
pellant had waived the provision of the contract relating thereto
ll). Defendant-Appellant then argued that it had been surprised beca1~:
Plaintiff-Respondent did not allege waiver in its Canplaint.
Plaintiff-Respondent had no obligation to plead waiver sir,c'
a defense was only .in response to Defendant-Appellant's claim at trii
Plaintiff-Respondent breached the contract.

Even if Defendant-Appel'.:

.

, ,_.. _.. : "" .·

had claimed a breach of contract in its Answer, there is no ooii:;d'·

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for Plaintiff-Respwdent. to file a
sive pleading to an Answer.

1

Further argunent on this nntter is tr'-''

later in this Brief.
Defmdant-Appellant then argues that the court should

hJ'.'i

c

r:,__ .. JT"r~>-:

the question of breach as a matter of law based on ·..ml Dei'" - ·
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alleges were undisputed facts.

A simple reading of the Stateffi2nt of Facts

of Appellant and Respondent clearly establishes that the facts ·were not

@disputed.
In the face of disputed facts, the question of Plaintiff's breach
was a question of fact rightly subr:.itted to the jury.

The breach of con-

tract that Defendant claims should have been determined as a matter of law
by t.1-ie trial C.Ourt was Plaintiff's failure to seal the roof at the end of
each working day as required by paragraph ll of the contract (Appellant's

Brief p. 14).

However, the breach claimed occurred after discussions be-

tween Defendant-Appellant's director of buildings and groimds, Bruce Ririe,

and its inspector on the job, Walter Jensen, and the Bills brothers as set

forth in the State:ient of Facts.

Based on those discussions, it is clear

that the jury could have found, as they did, that paragraph ll had been

waived.

That being true, there was no breach at all.
In 17 AfI1 Jur 2d Contracts, §390, the author states the general

law as follows:
"Strict and full performance of a contract by one
party rr.ay be waived by the other party, in which case
there is, to the extent of the waiver, no right to damages
for the failure to perfonn strictly or fully. This is in
accord with the elementary principle that eit.~ party to
a contract may waive any of the provisions made for his
benefit. . . . A defense that v;iork was not properly done
may also be waived, and there may be a mutual estoppel,
by waiver, as to the effect of a default.

* "'k * ·k
.
contract provisions may be waived expressly or
the waiver thereof may be implied from the acts of the
parties. Where one entitled to perfonmnce is present to
receive performance, -whatever is not exacted is considered
as waived, for if objection had been made on the gro1..n1d_o~
those matters in vhlch the proposed performance was deficient,
these mi.ght have been supplied at the time."
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The question of waiver, where facts indicate it oc

curre

d, .
cc;

an alleged breach, IDJSt be determined before the question of b . ,
reacn :-:..
not vice versa. The question of breach is entirely dependent upon t:b
question of waiver and would have been inco=ectly determined as a IT<'
of latv by the trial court in the face of the disputed facts.

In a case cited by Defendant-Appellant, Campbell Bldg. Co ....
State P.oad Cornnission, 70 P2d 857 (Utah 1937) at page 865, the Court.,
clear that the question of waiver
" . . . is a fact question to be determined by the
Court or the jury, as the case may be."
Defendant-Appellant bases its entire first argument on the premise fri:
the facts were tmdisputed as to Plaintiff's breach.

AB previously s~:

there would be no breach if, prior thereto, Defendant-Appellant waive:
conpliance with the provisions of paragraph 11 of the contract.

Th.LS ..

the question of waiver is disputed, based on the evidence, that w:iuld:
fortiori put the question of breach in dispute, since it would be 1E57·
whether in fact at the time of the alleged breach there was even a cl:.
of the contract to be breached.
As set forth in the Statement of Facts in this Brief as

c°''

with the Statanent of Facts in Defendant-Appellant's Brief, the facts::
in dispute as to whether there was a waiver and thus, the trial co:z~

rightly submitted the question of breach to the jury to be rnnsiderec
light of the question of waiver.
POilIT II
'IHE TRIAL ffilJRI' CORRECTI.Y All.DWED TilE JlJRY 'lD COtlSipQ\

AND DECIDE TilE ISSUE OF WAIVER WITH THE

Qll!'~s·~i

AL\ID CORRECTI.Y INSTRUCTED. THE JURY.
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A.

There is no obligation to plead waiver in Response to

~_Answer because no respcnsive pleading is necessary or required.

Appellant's contention is that the issue of waiver was improperly
raised well after the trial was underway and without prior notice to
Defendant in a pleading.
The rule of pleading affinnative defenses canes from Rule 8(c)
U. R. C. P., Hhich states:
"In a pleading to a preceding pl~, a party shall
set forth affirmatively . . . any . . ~irmtive defenses."
(Emphasis added)
Waiver is one affirmative defense listed.

Plaintiff-Respondent filed a

Conplaint and alleged therein that Defendant-Respondent had breached the
contract by unlawfully tenninating Plaintiff-Respondent as a result of
which damages were suffered.

Defendant-Respondent answered by denying

such allegations and pleading an affirmative defense that the work was
not clone in a "professional,

~rkrnanlike

and expeditious marmer".

There

was no affinnative defense raised that Plaintiff-Respondent breached its
contract.

At trial, for the first time, Defendant-Appellant cl.a:llood that

Plaintiff-Respondent breached the contract.

In response to such claim of

Defendant-Appellant at trial, Plaintiff-Respondent claimed that it did
not breach the contract because Defendant-Respondent had waived the provision of the contract allegedly breached (paragraph 11) and was thus
estopped to rely on it.
It was thEn. that Defendant-Appellant claimed Plaintiff-Respondent
could not rely on waiver because it had not plead it in its Complaint.
This is a ridiculous argument because Plaintiff was under no obligation
to plead waiver in its Canplaint.

Its Complaint was based on Defendant-
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Appellant's breach of contract, not ·waiver,

Waiver is

a

defense

rci,.

to Defendant-Appellant's claim that Plaintiff-Respondent breached it:
contract.
Even if Defendant-Appellant claimed a breach of contract b
Answer, Plaintiff-Respondent; had no obligation to respond to such al!,
tion because there is no obligation under the Utah Rules of Civil Pre.
to file a response to an Answer,
If Defendant-Appellant had filed a Counterclaim alleging br,.

of contract, then Plaintiff-Respondent would have been obligated to f;.
a Reply and to allege therein any affinnative defenses, such as waive:
estoppel, which it may have had to the allegations of the Counterc!ai:
Ho;vever, in this case no Counterclaim was filed.

In 28 Am Jur2d §169, under Estoppel and Waiver, the

autr~r ::

that
"One well-settled exception to the rule requiring a
waiver to be pleaded specially is when a party has no
opportunity to plead a waiver. In such case, evidence
of the waiver may be given at the trial with the sarr.e
conclusive effect as i f it had been pleaded specially
as a waiver.''
See also 120 ALR 8 at page 7 6, which collects the cases that supJXJrt '·
rule of law which are too numerous to cite here.
Appellant cites Cheney vs.· Rllcker, 181 P2d ii' (Utah 1963)"'
authority.

In this case, the Defendant failed to pJc;-;r1 a subsequent::

ment as an affirmative defense and Plaintiff claimed he

should rot:,
rt-·

been pennitted to rely on it.

The Defendant's Answer was the oppa -

to plead the affirmative defense which he failed to do,

In spite

failure, the Court stated that the Rules of Civil Pr< ·cduric
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. . must all be looked to in the light of
their even more ftmdamental purpose of liberalizing
both pleading and procedure to the end that the parties are afforded the privilege of presenting whatever legiti.'?ate contentions they have pertaining to
their dispute." 381 P2d 86, at 91.
The Court thereupon excused Defendant's failure and affirmed the lower
court judgrrent in his favor.
A case more similar to the case at bar is "Mabee vs, Continental
Casualty Corrrpa.ny, 219 P. 598 (Idaho 1923) where Defendant contended that

the evidence of waiver was not admissible in the absence of an allegation
of waiver in the Plaintiff's Canplaint.

It was the Appellant-Defendant

who first alleged a contract provision and its breach as an affirmative

defense.

As in Utah' s system of pleading, no response to Appellant's

allegation was required in Idaho.

The Court stated:

''The tender of this issue by the affinnative htswer
joined the issue, and the Respondent, under the issue so
joined, ,.;as entitled to avail herself of all defenses
Which she could corrrnand, whether they consisted of matters of mere denial or admitted the facts as pleaded and
sought to avoid the same by reason of waiver, estoppel
or other legal reason." 219 P 598, at 602.
Citing McKune vs. Continental Casualty Canpany, 154 P 990 (Idaho
1915) , the Court repeated:
"Under these facts , we think that it would be the
height of technicality to refuse to consider the question of waiver." 219 P 598 at 602.
It is clear from the authority cited that Plaintiff-Respondent
had every right to rely on waiver as a defense to Defendant-Appellant's
claim that it had breached the contract.
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B.

The Court correctly submitted the question of breach'·
~

the jury on special verdict.
The Court detenrrined that it \..c>uld be best to submit this'·
to the jury on a spa:ial verdict and the following question was as'~:
tive to breach of contract:
"Did the actions of the Plaintiff in late October
and early Noverber of 1974, in removing a portion of
the roofing on Highland High School, and the n-art1er in
which it was left, constitute a material breach of the
contract between Plaintiff and Defendant?
Yes

"

No

The Court properly instructed the jury as to what constit:u:,
a ''material" breach of contract and also correctly instructed the j\:"
a default in performance of the contract may be "waived " The Courcc
instructed the jury as to mat wuuld constitute a waiver of a breac'
contract.
It is submitted that the Court acted properly 1.'1.th respect·
the special verdict question and the instructions.
C.

There was sufficient evidence to allow the jury to dee;:

whether Defendant's agents had the necessary authority_ to waive c~
with the provision.-:; of paragraph ll of the contr_act_:_
Defendant-Appellant argues that it must be detennined i·.M-~
Walter Jensen, Defe:ndant' s inspector <lL the building sitEo, or Bn.ce '~
Defendant's director of building and grounds, hac1 au ti iori ty or
. h
to deny authority to v.-raive strict per f ormance wit

1.

Defendant-Respvndent is

i·:e!I'

c-"~·r, 11 oft[,

]'3rdc'.i' -

·

est~ E?..-~

authority.
·
the auc:-::
In 28 Am Jur2d §155, tmder Estoppel and \!i1iver'
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"Rights or privileges may be waived by the person
for ,.Jhose benefit they were intended, or by his duly
authorized agent."
In 3 Arn Jur2d §76, under Agency, the author states:

"It is a general principle of the lC!\v of agency,
running through all contracts made by agents with
third parties, that the principals are bound by the
acts of their agents which fall within the apparent
scope of the authority of the agents, and that the
principals will not be pennitted to deny the authority
of their agents against innocent third parties who
have dealt with those agents in good faith." Harrison vs.
Auto Securities Co., 257 P 677 (Utah 1927) at 679.

l·tr. Ririe, in his direct examination by Defendant-Appellant's
attorney, said he had authority to rrodify the specifications on a limited
basis for types of materials, canpletion dates, prices, but not paragraph
11.

(Tr 250).

Yet, earlier, he admitted that Mr. Jensen had, according

to his instructions, told Plaintiff they were cancelling out part of the
original contract and not to complete a portion of another section of the
roof.

(Tr 33-34, 56)

In addition, Mr. Ririe had authority to grant approval

of Mr. Bills' bid for additional work which increased the contract from
$29,800 to $51,604.

(Exhibit 13-P; T 15)

1'1.r. Ririe and Mr. Jensen both testified that Mr. Jensen was on

the jobsite everyday just prior to the alleged breach with the responsibility
and authority to enforce the contract and be sure all provisions were com-

plied r,,Jith.

(Tr 55, 269-270)

About ten days prior to the alleged breach, Ken Bills, president
of Plaintiff COillJany, met with Mr. Ririe in his office and discussed the
possibility of tearing up a large section of the roof to speed up the reroofing to attelllJt its completion before winter as Mr. Ririe expressed a
desire to ha1,·e done.

He explained that they wouldn't be able to cover it
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each day and Hr. Ririe said that was ok i f they had some visqueen a':(__
for a stonn.

(Tr 164)

Mr. Ririe denies this.

(Tr 246)

Five or six days prior to the alleged breach, Ne. Jensen::-the Bills brothers up on the roof that Plaintiff was repairing, <mG t
cussed the sarre proposal.
good news.

(Tr 82, 271-272)

Hr. Jensen thought "It:.:.

They were making very slow progress at this stage." (Tr:

It is clear from the testimony that Hr. Jensen did not object. (TiJ
165, 271-272, ll7-ll8)

The roof remained open for at least five days.

Mr. Jensen still did not object.

In fact, he gave his tacit appro'«ll

the procedure beirg followed.
Even i f Hr. Ririe or Mr. Jensen had no express or actual t·
to waive strict canpliance with paragraph 11, all of their actions a:.:
conversaticns with Plaintiff-Respondent would have lead Plaintiff-Eis:-·
to reasonably and honestly believe that they had such authority.
Appellant cites Campbell Bldg. Co. vs. State Road Ccmnissir
supra, in an attanpt to show that Plaintiff-Respondent's belief in Ji,
Appellant's agent's authority was imreasonable.

Perhaps it may have:

under the facts of the Campbell case, wherein the authority of the er:
was clearly spelled out in the contract and well known to the contr~:
The provision in the contract claimed to have been waived was the rec~
of written purchase orders, going to the heart of the engineer's aufa
But, these are not the facts of this case.

Nothing in the specifico:-

or ccntract spelled out Mr. Ririe' s or Hr. Jens en' s authority and Pl~
Respondent had no notice of any limitations to it, nor of anyone el3i
w:mld have more authority than

~fr.

Ririe or Hr. Jensen.

- Defendar·tIn ligjlt of these facts, justice would reqmrc
·
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be es topped from denying Mr. Ririe' s or Mr. Jensen's authority to waive

paraz,raph 11.
2.

The issue of waiver was pronerly submitted to

the jury.
Assuming the jury determined that Mr. Jensen and/or Mr.
Ririe either had actual authority, apparent authority, or were estopped
from denying aut..1-iority, it could then deterr:rlne whether these agents waived
paragraph 11.
A i:vaiver, according to the generally accepted definition, is the
voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a
§154, Estoppel and Waiver.

kn~

right.

28 lID.l Jur2d

Brigham Young University vs. Industrial Carmis-

sion of Utah, 279 P 889 (Utah 1929) .
The testim:my is in conflict as to the conversation between Ken
Bills and .Mr. Ririe in his office about ten days prior to the alleged
breach,

(Tr 164, 246)

but is not in dispute as to the occurrence of the

conversation between 11r. Jensen, Ken Bills and Russell Bills on the roof of
the building less than a week before the alleged breach.

There may, how-

ever, be some conflict as to the conclusion reached at the end of that
conversation as far as Mr. Jensen was concerned, but not as far as the

Mr. Jensen claillled his intention was to check

Billses were concerned.

with flr. Ririe before going ahead with the proposal, although he never objected to it.

(Tr 84)

The Billses ln:lderstood they were to go ahead with

the proposal as long as there was visqueen on hand to cover the roof if it
rained.

(Tr 165)

It is disputed whether Th"'O days later Mr. Jensen told

Ken Bills to get the roof sealed up.
Ken Bi 11::: sail be didn't.

(Tr 166)

}1'.r. Jensen said he did.

(Tr 273)

These are all facts going directly to
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the issue of whether or not Defendant's right to have the roof Sea'.s:
day was waived.

In the face of such disputed facts, it 1vas propei £:

trial court to submit the issue to the jury.

Campbell Bldg. Co. vs.
--------.:__

Road Ccmnission, ~D.

The instruction to the jury concerning 1vaiver was

P"··

..:.::.:::_

Defendant-Appellant's contention is that instruction 1114, l cerning waiver, was confusing because it allowed the ju..; to co;o..;ice:
as an integral part of determining the material breach.
page 23)

(Appellar.:',

As stated in the first argument, waiver is an integral par:

detennining breach since i f the waiver occurred before the breach, t.2
would be no paragraph 11 in the contract to breach.
The second fault found with the insttuction is that

Plaine~

to shav the prerequisite authority of Defendant's agents. The pre.;:_
cussion concerning the agent's authority,

with evidence cited fran r,

transcript, clearly indicates sufficient evidence of authority

LO

al!:

waiver instructioo to be given to the jury.

CONCLUSION
It appears from Defendant-Appellant's Brief that the basic:·
with the action of the trial court is that it allowed the jury to

Ceo

all of the evidence with respect to the questions of Plaintiff's bre<c
concluding whether or not Plaintiff breached the contract, rafr.e: c:.:
structing the jury that Defendant's agents had no authJrity co waLi that Defendant didn't waive and, in turn, that Plaintiff breached fr,·
tract as a matter of law.

To do so would have kept nurn.erous factu.d

from the jury that they alone

IIBJS t

. e m· licroht of the disva'.2deterrrun

All of the factual issues relating to Plai.,,---1tiff' s al l L'.ged breacL ·"'
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closely related and dependent upon each other that it was not improper for
the trial court to submit the entire matter to the jury pursuant to the
instrnctions c:;iven, and the final conclusion of 'Whether there was a breach
by the Plaintiff-Respondent to be the only one to which a special :interroga-

tory was addressed.
Once the jury determined that Plaintiff-Respondent did not breach
paragraph 11 of the contract, obviously because they determined DefendantAppellant had waived its right to require CO£q)liance with said paragraph,
the Court then determined as a matter of law t_hat Defendant-Appellant breached
the contract by <IDlawfully terminating Plaintiff-Respondent, and entered
Judgrnmt for the damages assessed by the jury in the sum of $13, 898. 87.
It is respectfully submitted by Pla:intiff-Respondent that this
Honorable Court should affinn the Judgment of the trial court and jury in
favor of Plaintiff-Respondent and against Defendant-Appellant.
Respectfully submitted,

"MOR.GAN' SCALLEY'

um

& KIMBLE

J G. ~DRGA."l'
Attorney for Pla:intiffpondent
345 South State Street, Suite 200
Salt Lal<e City, Utah
84111
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CERTITICATE OF DELIVERY

r HEREBY

CESTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing

Brief of Respondent was hand delivered to Tim Dalton Dunn, Esquire, 702
Kearns Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, Attomey for Defendant-Appellant,
on this 22nd day of February, 1978.
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